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Consent, Estoppel, and Reasonableness: 
Three Challenges to Universal International Law, 
by Anthony D'Amato, 10 Virginia Journal of International Law 1-31 (1969) 
 
Abstract: Like consent and estoppel, the concept of reasonableness, while failing to provide an adequate 
explanation of the source of obligation in customary international law, does play an important psychological role in 
adding to the pressure of international norms upon states. The result is to increase the sense of legality of the rules 
that are accepted by states as part of "customary international law."  This is not to say that each and every alleged 
rule of universal international law must contain one or more of the elements of consent, estoppel, or reasonableness 
in order for it to be "valid." 
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 [pg1]Although a very important part of international law is made up of rules found in 
treaties, conventions, executive agreements and contracts among nations, the usual image 
conjured up by the phrase "international law" is that of a body of rules that apply, or should 
apply, to all states irrespective of their explicit consent or "sovereign will" of the moment. If law 
were dependent merely upon each state's will, then there could be no violation of the law and the 
term would be fictitious. 
  
 Something close to fictionalization of universal rules of international law has appeared in 
the writings of several prominent scholars who deal with general customary law. For their 
theories of consent, estoppel, and reasonableness come very close to conditioning, if they do not 
actually condition, the validity of international law upon the wishes of the "defendant" state. 
While some degree of acquiescence of the member states of a system is necessary to the 
continued effective functioning of the system, a state will from time to time have to comply with 
norms with which it may not agree. Further inadequacies of these theories are their single-
factored explanation of the source of obligation in international law and their reliance upon a 
single intellectual task, logical deduction.  
 
 Nevertheless, these theories—when they are actually applicable—do have a definite 
psychological appeal which adds to the felt pressure of international law on the "defendant." The 
present paper is an attempt to distinguish, and to show the importance of distinguishing, between 




 The idea that a state is not "bound" by a rule of international law unless it had previously 
"consented" to that rule is an extreme form of the positivist tradition in international 
jurisprudence which flourished in the nineteenth century. Its proponents, who in Lauterpacht's 
words had an "exaggerated regard for sovereignty",FN1 tried to explain custom as merely a tacit 
treaty, entered into by all the states which [pg2] had consented to the given rules.FN2  In recent 
years this position has found important advocates among Soviet jurists who have seized upon the 
notion of strict consent as a way either to reject "capitalist" norms or simply, in Professor 
Lissitzyn's words, "to pick and choose among the norms of international law."FN3  One of the 
leading spokesmen of the Soviet position, Professor Tunkin, has written that "agreement is the 
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essence of custom" in that it expresses the "will of a State" to "consent" to a rule and thus 
become bound by it.FN4  Some non-Soviet writers have also concluded that consent is at the 
basis of custom.  MacGibbon, for example, attempts to explain the fundamental dilemma of 
custom (that an act is formative of custom if it is undertaken with a conviction that it is already 
required by international law) by focusing upon consent and acquiescence. If a state does not 
protest the actions of other states, MacGibbon argues that the acquiescence implied by this 
failure to protest 
 
seems necessarily to involve the further otiose conviction that participants in the 
course of conduct are entitled to act as they are doing; and this in turn appears to 
leave little alternative to submission in the belief that submission is obligatory. 
FN5 
  
In 1954 Judge Fitzmaurice reached the same conclusion in a more moderately worded statement 
that has been frequently quoted:  
 
Where a general rule of customary international law is built up by the common 
practice of States, although it may be a little unnecessary to have recourse to the 
notion of agreement (and a little difficult to detect it in what is often the 
uncoordinated, independent, if similar, action of States), it is probably true to say 
that consent is latent in the mutual tolerations that allow the practice to be built up 
at all; and actually patent in the eventual acceptance (even if tacit) of the practice, 
as constituting a binding rule of law.FN6 
  
 All of these views share common ground in the belief that international law does not exist 
unless the individual state agrees that it shall exist, and that therefore an individual state is not 
bound by anything that it has not consented to. The leading case on customary [pg3] law seems 
at first glance to corroborate this position. The World Court in the Lotus Case held that 
  
International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of law 
binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in 
conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and 
established in order to regulate the relations between these co-existing 
independent communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims. 
FN7  
 
 However, on closer inspection, the statement in the Lotus Case may be seen to stand 
more for a limitation on the idea of consent than a reinforcement of it. The Court was careful to 
talk about aggregate consent; the terms are specified in the plural and not in the singular. This is 
a significant point even though it seems not to have been particularly noticed by writers on 
consent or custom. For it is in fact harmless to speak of aggregate consent; it is a truism that 
international law is the creation of all the states. From a functional point of view, the only 
difficulty arises when a claim is made that each individual state—indeed, the defendant state in 
any given controversy—must itself have consented to a rule in order to make the rule binding 
upon it. One writer who focused upon the distinction between aggregate and particular consent 
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was Professor Jaffe, who in 1933 wrote that "consent is given to international law as a system 
rather than 'to each and every relationship contained in it."FN8  
 
 The Lotus Case made it clear that neither France nor Turkey was going to prevail because 
of any notion of particular consent. Rather, the decision turned on whether customary law was 
created in four previous municipal-court cases, only two of which involved French vessels and 
none of which involved a Turkish vessel.FN9  The World Court has had numerous occasions to 
apply customary international law, and yet nowhere has it held as a matter of general customary 
law that the defendant state must have consented to the rule in question in order to be bound by 
it. The Court has no doubt recognized the importance of the general observation that the very 
existence of international law in international claim-conflict situations is at stake in this question 
of consent.  If the only way a defendant state can be held accountable to law is by proving that 
that state consented to the particular rule in question, hardly any case could ever be won by a 
plaintiff state. Indeed, most disputes arise precisely because the disputing states have not 
specifically consented to the rule at issue. Since the facts of international state behavior 
demonstrate the continuing relevance of legal arguments based upon custom, and since the  
[pg4] World Court and all other international tribunals have been able upon occasion to reach 
decisions against defendant states in the absence of proof that the defendants had consented to 
the rules claimed by the plaintiffs, Professor Jaffe's observation seems to be the only possible 
conclusion. By the fact of their engaging in international legal argumentation, or by virtue of 
their claims of the benefits of international rules relating to boundaries or shared resources, all 
states have in fact consented to the international legal system—not to each and every rule in it, 
but to the secondary rules of law—formation and the generally accepted mode of legal 
argumentation and legal standards of relevance. This consent is, after all, a manifestation of the 
self-interest of states to settle a significant number of their international disputes by law, or to 
avoid frictions that would otherwise be present if that law depended in each application upon the 
consent of the state objecting to the particular application.  
 
 A more detailed look at state practice strengthens the validity of these observations. First, 
one would suspect that, if the particular consent theory were valid, new states would typically 
engage in the practice of making a list of all the international norms they want and of rejecting 
the others. But no state has ever done this. Nor have the existing states ever asked a new state, 
upon its entry into the family of nations, to consent to existing rules of law. Indeed, it appears to 
be a general rule of law, as Lauterpacht pointed out, that a new state "cannot repudiate a single 
rule."FN10  Of course, what this means is that a purported repudiation would not be given legal 
effect by the other states, not that a new state lacks the physical ability to repudiate a rule.  
 
 Further, if new states wanted to repudiate existing rules, a convenient opportunity would 
be when subject to suit in an international tribunal. But Professor Waldock observed in 1962: 
  
Nor has any State ever argued before the [World] Court that it was exempt from a 
general customary rule simply because it was a new State that objected to the rule. 
In the Right of Passage case, for example, it never occurred to India to meet 
Portugal's contention as to a general customary right of passage to enclaves by 
saying that she was a new State; nor did Poland, new-born after the First World 
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War, ever make such a claim in any of her many cases before the Permanent 
Court. FN11  
 
 This is not to say that the new states have all accepted all the existing rules of 
international law with enthusiasm. On the contrary, as Professor Lissitzyn has shown, many of 
the new states resent their [pg5] colonial past and assert that some rules, such as those relating to 
expropriation, are not binding upon them.FN12 Nevertheless, their attitude even to rules of 
expropriation has not in practice been extremist; as Professor Lissitzyn has also pointed out, 
when occasions arose for the new nations to support Communist proposals on expropriation of 
foreign investments, many did not lend their support.FN13 
  
 Broadly speaking, Professor Waldock's observation seems true: "the new States have at 
least as much to lose as anyone else from a denial of the validity of existing international law." 
FN14 Rather than trying to set up specific exemptions for themselves, which would be an 
espousal of the consent doctrine, the new states have chosen to express support of international 
law while at the same time working to help change the content of that law so as better to reflect 
the needs of the growing numbers of new states. They are working particularly in the field of 
treaties and General Assembly resolutions, as pointed out by Professor Bishop in his Hague 
lectures of 1965, to change the content of substantive rules.FN15  Even Professor Tunkin, who 
attempts to maintain a strict individual consent or "doctrine of agreement" approach, has 
conceded that 
 
if a new state enters without reservations into official relations with other states, this 
means that it recognizes a certain body of principles and norms of existing international 
law, which constitute the basic principles of international relations.FN16 
  
Since no new state has entered with reservations, and since Professor Tunkin has not, and could 
not, proclaim which "basic principles" the new states have, in some unstated manner, 
“recognized," perhaps even Professor Tunkin might be included among those who really mean 
by the consent theory the aggregate consent of all the states to the international legal system and 
not particular consent to each and every substantive rule within the system.  
 
 A second example of state practice that does violence to the "doctrine of agreement" 
supports Kelsen's argument that if an existing state acquires for the first time an access to the sea, 
that state immediately becomes subject to all the norms of international law regarding conduct of 
states on the seas, without there being any attempt on the part of other states to secure its consent 
or efforts by the acquiring state to pick and choose among the norms with which it agrees. FN17 
We [pg6] may expect the same result to follow as states in turn acquire the technology to 
participate in activities in outer space; they will find awaiting them a fairly well developed body 
of legal rules fashioned primarily by the pioneers.  
 
 A third example of state practice which calls into question the concept of particular 
consent is the remarkable fact that a state's rights and duties in international law, in Professor 
Lissitzyn's words, "are not impaired by changes in its law, government, or constitutional 
structure, no matter how violent, at least so long as the core of its territory and population remain 
the same."FN18 Yet consent, in the sense given by Professors Tunkin, MacGibbon, and 
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Fitzmaurice at the beginning of this chapter, is something that is expressed by particular nation-
state officials acting as representatives of their governments. It makes no sense to 
anthropomorphize "states" to say that a state itself has consented; yet even if the particular 
individuals who expressed a state's consent are overthrown in a revolution or defeated in the next 
election, the consent is not revoked. Treaties and contracts persist, as well as the state's 
obligations to the general body of customary international rules.  
 
 Fourth, international law sometimes assumes that a state has consented when in fact it has 
not. Treaties of peace, for example, are valid even when imposed upon the vanquished state. 
Moreover, a state is bound by a treaty if it has been entered into on the state's behalf by officials 
having the apparent authority to bind the state, even if in fact they lacked authority under the 
state's own constitution. Article 2, section 6, of the United Nations Charter extends certain 
principles to non-Member states. And the World Court's advisory opinion in the Reservations to 
the Genocide Convention CaseFN19 has signalled a breakdown of the strict consent theory 
where it had hitherto been thought to be especially applicable—in the matter of defining the 
parties to a treaty when some of them make reservations not accepted by the others.  
 
 Fifth, if the consent theory were truly an expression of an individual state's will to be 
bound, logic would require that if a state changes its mind it would cease to be bound. But 
international law has consistently given the opposite answer. Thus, for example, a state cannot 
get rid of its treaty obligations by passing contrary municipal laws.  
 
 Finally, it is interesting to note that in a recent study of state practice as expressed 
primarily through domestic judicial interpretations of international obligations, Professor Falk 
concludes that the alleged requirement of presumed consent in customary law must be dropped. 
FN20 Consent is a vertical verbal rationalization that in Professor [pg7] Falk's analysis does not 
accord with the primarily horizontal ordering of authority and power among independent and 
relatively equal states in the international system. This conception appears to be closer to the 
meaning of the authoritativeness of custom than Professor Tunkin's solipsistic doctrine of 
agreement. 
  
 When a single term such as "consent" raises such logical difficulties, the temptation 
arises to resort to a kindred term to mask some of the problems. Thus, the concept of 
"acquiescence" has recently become fashionable. But it is difficult to distinguish meaningfully 
between consent and acquiescence, and especially between implied consent and acquiescence.  
 
 In situations where these terms are interchangeable, the notion of acquiescence would be 
subject to the same infirmities as that of consent. Writers who have attempted to expand the 
notion of acquiescence to cover situations falling short of implied consent add no strength to the 
concept. MacGibbon, for example, defines acquiescence as "silence or absence of protest in 
circumstances which generally call for a positive reaction signifying an objection."FN21 But this 
is an ambiguous formula. While it embraces certain clear situations which indeed "call for" an 
expression of protest (for instance, an attack on an embassy abroad), it also includes many other 
situations in which a state refrains from protesting another state's actions or omissions because 
the protest will be ineffective and only serve to annoy the other state. For example, many states 
may deplore France's nuclear test series in the Pacific Ocean, particularly in light of the Limited 
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Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which most states have signed; yet only a few states have formally 
protested France's actions.FN22  Their silence need not amount to acquiescence, but may rather 
be attributable to a realistic political assessment that a diplomatic protest would not deter France 
in the slightest but might only serve to worsen relations with France. On the other hand, there 
may exist situations where a state issues a formal note of protest but, by failing to take further 
steps, has in fact acquiesced. This could occur, for example, when a state expropriates a foreign-
owned mining company that had paid below-par salaries to local workers and had shipped all 
profits abroad. The foreign state may issue a formal diplomatic note of protest on behalf of its 
national whose property was confiscated, perhaps because of the pressure exerted domestically 
by that national, and may nevertheless "let it be understood" informally that it is sympathetic 
with the act of expropriation. From these and many other possible situations, it is evident that 
there is no warrant for assuming that a state's silence or failure to protest is the equivalent of 
acquiescence. 
 
 This conclusion is apparent from the situations MacGibbon himself [pg8] cites. His 
examples prove at most that there is non-acquiescence when a state protests; they do not prove 
the converse, that discrete circumstances might be defined which "call for" protest.FN23 For it is 
very difficult, except in certain clear situations where states normally protest certain types of 
acts, to say that protest is "called for" by the circumstances. Further, it is nearly impossible to say 
it in a situation that might create a new rule of international law or change an old rule; for such a 
situation, by definition, will have no precedents with respect to the practice of protest. In sum, 
MacGibbon's definition and use of the concept of acquiescence amount to finding acquiescence 
whenever states are silent. This, in turn, amounts to presumed acquiescence, which is not an 
analytically useful concept but merely another cumbersome legal fiction.  
 
 The vagueness of the term "acquiescence" may account for its use in a related but 
different sense, worth examining briefly. This is the notion of acquiescence not solely on the part 
of the state directly affected by the actions or omissions of another, but on the part of the 
community of states in general.  Judge Hudson's fourth criterion necessary for the emergence of 
a customary rule of law, set forth in a draft prepared for the International Law Commission, is 
"general acquiescence in the practice by other States."FN24 Similarly, Judge Fitzmaurice wrote 
of the effect of consent "in the eventual acceptance (even if tacit) of the practice, as constituting 
a binding rule of law."FN25 It is evident that what these writers have in mind is the truism that 
international law is only that which is recognized as such in the consensus of states. If a given 
rule, or the practice giving rise to a rule, meets with objection by the overwhelming majority of 
states-not simply verbal objection or notes of protest, but a complete unwillingness to recognize 
that rule in all relevant claim-conflict situations—then by definition that rule is not a rule of 
international law. 
  
 International law is that law which is manifested in the practice of all or most of the 
states; in this sense, it is the law that is generally accepted or "acquiesced in" by the international 
community. But in functional terms, the notion of acceptance or acquiescence does not normally 
help us decide what the rules in the international legal system in fact are. For only a very few 
rules can be cited that have actually been "acquiesced in" by explicit expression on the part of the 
preponderance of states. The great bulk of primary rules in all their detail owe their existence 
7 
 
directly to the workings of the secondary rules of law-formation, which themselves are the 
manifestations of the use by states of international legal techniques in their claim-conflict  
[pg9] situations. It is somewhat misleading to condition the validity of primary rules upon the 
acquiescence of other states, for the acquiescence does not relate to the primary rules but rather 
to the propriety of the processes (the secondary rules) by which the primary rules were created. 
Thus, the concepts of consent and acquiescence tend to become superfluous when they concern 
general community attitudes. To say that the community of states has acquiesced is simply to say 
that the rule is a valid rule of international law. This was indeed indirectly acknowledged by 
Judge Fitzmaurice six years after he wrote the passage previously cited. As Special Rapporteur 
to the International Law Commission's study on treaties, he noted that all States can be deemed 
to consent to rules embodied in treaties when such rules gain general-currency in international 
customary law.FN26 By thus imputing consent to the states, Fitzmaurice attests to its analytic 
uselessness. 
  
 Despite all the analytical difficulties involved in attempts to find consent or one of its 
permutations as the basis for customary law, it is nevertheless important to recognize the 
psychological importance of the role played by consent in reinforcing the authoritativeness of 
custom. The fact that some states do consent to some rules, the fact that some instances clearly 
amount to acquiescence, the fact that many international acts are the result of mutual tolerances, 
and even the increasing importance of treaties (which are clear cases of consent) in the body of 
international rules, all add to the acceptability of customary rules of international law. 
Government officials newly in power, for instance, often find it convenient to explain to their 
constituents that the state cannot do certain international acts because the state itself, through 
previous government officials, had agreed not to do so. The feeling of having previously 
consented to something is a powerful curb on desires to do something else. Hobbes recognized 
this in his attempt to show that citizens had constructively consented to the powers of the 
Leviathan, and Burke carried the process even farther by arguing that ancestral consent to the 
constitution binds the present inhabitants of a state.  Apart from the merits of these political 
theories, their very existence and fame attest to the psychological importance people attach to the 
idea of consent. In international litigation, the attempt is invariably made to find some sort of 
evidence that the opponent state at one time consented to the rule it now opposes. In the Status of 
Eastern Greenland Case, for example, a mere verbal remark by one foreign minister to another 
was given critical importance in establishing one country's consent to the other's sovereignty in 
Greenland.FN27 But the frequency of recourse to arguments about prior consent does not 
establish the necessity of proving consent in [pg10] each alleged instance of a customary rule; 
rather it illustrates the psychological importance of consent, with respect to some rules or to the 




 The preceding section concluded that failure to protest does not necessarily amount to 
acquiescence. Acquiescence aside, it is nevertheless open for someone to argue that a state's 
failure to protest estops it to protest a similar rule in the future. If a state is thus estopped, it is 
effectively bound by that rule. That this process might be a complete explanation of why custom 
works is the conclusion reached by Dr. Zdenek Slouka in a recent doctoral dissertation entitled 




 In analyzing the concept of estoppel as it might operate in the formation of customary 
international law, it is important to look at the essence of its meaning and not at the manifold 
refinements grafted onto it by domestic legal systems. McNair in 1924 and Bowett in 1957 tried 
to argue that estoppel in international law necessarily contained certain elements, such as the 
refinement that the statement in question must have been addressed specifically to the party 
relying upon it.FN29 But it is unrealistic to assume that international law would appropriate all 
the trappings of domestic legal concepts. A treaty, for example, is quite different from a 
municipal-law contract, and neither one has any claim to authority as a reference-point for the 
other. Particularly in an attempt to understand the workings of a concept as unique and difficult 
as custom, it is important not to get sidetracked by preconceptions derived from familiarity with 
domestic law.  
 
 The essential meaning of "estoppel" as used by Dr. Slouka is that if a state gives the 
impression of going along with a certain practice or rule, perhaps by not protesting against it 
when it was convenient to do so, that state should not be allowed later to disavow the practice or 
the rule. Unfortunately, Dr. Slouka did not fully develop the concept of estoppel in his 
dissertation, as he later admitted, and in future writing he intends to avoid the term and use 
instead an "expectation-reliance complex" as an ordering factor. FN30 For the purpose of 
analyzing his argument, it is preferable to assume that "estoppel" roughly means an "expectation-
reliance complex" than to criticize as inaccurate the use of the term "estoppel" and thus be unable 
to examine the main argument on its merits. 
  
 One additional terminological point needs mention. There are numerous cases dealing 
with the acquisition of prescriptive rights, both in domestic and in international law, where 
failure to protest is a [pg11] constitutive element in the finding of title in favor of the possessor 
or user as against the owner. It would be dangerous to infer anything about customary 
international law in general from this specific class of cases. They would be unworthy even of a 
caveat were it not for the fact that MacGibbon has made extensive use of the term "estoppel" in 
these cases and has implied that his reasoning was applicable to customary international law in 
general.FN31 Quite to the contrary, in cases of acquisitive prescription, a finding that the owner 
is estopped to protest the possessor's new rights is simply a legal conclusion on the question of 
title and not an explanation of why the result was reached.  
 
 Moving now to a consideration of Dr. Slouka's thesis, the salient feature of his analysis is 
that the concept of estoppel is a thorough, relativistic substitute for the notion of a general 
customary law. Dr. Slouka never proves the nonexistence of general law; rather, he assumes that 
international legal relationships are made up of a large number of specific bilateral relationships 
of varying degrees of legal force. Although he cautions the reader at the outset of his study that 
his conclusions pertain only to the area that he has examined-that of the continental shelf-he 
conveys the impression that any particularistic study of any given area of "customary law" would 
result in the same conclusion of relativity. Indeed, among his conclusions is the generalization 
that the role of the factors affecting the emergence of a customary norm "is relative to the 
conditions in which those factors operate." FN32 But we should not rest on the observations that 
Dr. Slouka has assumed, and not proven, that the law of the continental shelf is made up of a 
number of bilateral relationships, or that he has not demonstrated whether his approach with 
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respect to the continental shelf is applicable in other areas. Rather, let us examine his main line 
of reasoning to see whether the assumptions he makes are at all persuasive as ways of 
approaching a legal problem.  
 
 Dr. Slouka's main reasoning concerns three hypothetical cases which might have arisen in 
the early 1950's. Had they arisen, they would have tested the legal validity of competing claims 
relating to the continental shelf. 
 
A.  Hypothetical 1: The United States v. Great Britain 
  
 In the first of these hypothetical cases, The United States v. Great Britain, an American 
oil company is supposed to have been engaged in the exploration and exploitation of oil on the 
outer submarine areas [pg12] adjacent to Abu Dhabi, a British protectorate whose Sheikh had 
proclaimed in 1949 his exclusive jurisdiction and control over those submarine areas.FN33 The 
oil company decides not to pay Great Britain for exploitation rights, and the United States 
espouses the company's claim. What legal arguments could the United States use'?  
 
 Dr. Slouka argues that it could not maintain that the submarine areas in question are a res 
communis exploitable by the first comer, as such a position would "expressly revoke" the 
Truman Proclamation of 1945 in which the United States itself asserted its jurisdiction and 
control over its contiguous continental shelf.FN34 Moreover, assuming this hypothetical case 
had arisen in 1953, the United States by that time had implemented its continental shelf policy by 
various legislative decrees and by administrative practice involving over sixty governmental 
agencies. These moves by the United States government, Dr. Slouka argues, created an 
expectation on the part of other countries that the United States would not claim any rights on 
any continental shelf other than its own. Dr. Slouka finds in this fact a specific estoppel for the 
United States to claim oil rights in the area. Secondly, he argues that the United States could not 
maintain a res nullius concept of the continental shelf, which would award title to specific areas 
of any continental shelf to the effective occupier. For such a claim would officially renounce the 
spirit of the 1945 Truman Proclamation, which contained general terms and concepts that 
betokened reciprocity. Moreover, res nullius would, if espoused by the United States, cast doubt 
upon the legal status of its own contiguous continental shelf. Finally, a British oil company 
actually engaged in exploitation off Abu Dhabi by 1953 probably had relied upon the Truman 
Proclamation's apparent disavowal of res nullius, and this operates to estop the United States' 
claim off the coast of Abu Dhabi. 
  
 Although Dr. Slouka has attempted in this case, with admirable specificity, to indicate 
how custom works in practice, there are several difficulties. First, a claim by the United States in 
apparent contradiction to the Truman Proclamation of 1945 would not "expressly revoke" the 
latter; there is no such concept of express revocation either in international law or in the law of 
the United States. Nor would such a claim amount to an official renunciation of the terms of the 
Truman Proclamation, which after all could be characterized as relating specifically to the 
continental shelf contiguous to the United States and not passing on the question of foreign 
continental shelves. Even if there was a "spirit of reciprocity" in the Proclamation, this may have 
been wholly gratuitous. At best, Dr. Slouka's [pg13] arguments amount to a position that it 
would be unwise as a matter of policy for the United States to espouse the oil company's claim, 
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not that such an espousal would be insufficient in law. To this extent he is of course right, for his 
case is purely hypothetical; the United States never espoused such a claim.  
 
 Second, even though American companies, with American administrative and legislative 
support, were busy exploiting the American continental shelf, this fact is not sufficient to explain 
why the United States would be estopped to make a claim on behalf of an American company 
attempting to exploit a foreign continental shelf. Analogously, many American firms have built 
manufacturing plants in foreign countries; the mere fact that they first built plants in the United 
States does not estop the United States from attempting to protect their foreign plants from 
confiscation.  
 
 Third, we must not lose sight of the fact in Dr. Slouka's hypothetical case that the 
American oil company had already established itself off the coast of Abu Dhabi and had begun 
the exploration for and exploitation of oil. Great Britain had not prevented the construction of the 
drilling rigs. What reliance interest, therefore, does Great Britain have? It expects to be paid for 
the exploitation, but this is hardly a reliance interest; if it were, then all plaintiffs would win all 
cases involving monetary claims. On the other hand, if Great Britain could show that it refrained 
from exploiting the exact areas occupied by the American company because of reliance on the 
Truman Proclamation and the "spirit of reciprocity," then perhaps there would be an estoppel. 
But this would be exceedingly difficult to prove in 1953 when many areas were available for 
exploitation and only few were actually utilized. Indeed, the presence of a British company also 
drilling for oil off Abu Dhabi indicates that the American company was not occupying the only 
possible position for a drilling rig. 
  
 A fourth, and perhaps even more basic, difficulty with Dr. Slouka's analysis is that it 
proceeds on the assumptions that res communis and res nullius positions are relevant 
alternatives. But this introduces general international law into what Dr. Slouka had attempted to 
keep as a pure bilateral situation. Dr. Slouka assumed that the United States, if it wanted to back 
the oil company's claim, would have to adopt either a general res communis or a general res 
nullius position with respect to all continental shelves. Why could not the United States adopt 
instead a completely relativistic position that there are no general legal alternatives, that there are 
only specific situations, and in one of them the United States owns its own continental shelf 
while in another it has the right to exploit the one off Abu Dhabi? Such a position might seem 
unwise or even greedy; on the other hand, it might strike some as reasonable, if account is taken 
of the community interest in the rapid exploitation of accessible oil deposits by the most 
technologically able states. But wise or unwise, such a policy is not [pg14] necessarily illegal if 
analyzed in the vacuum of a purely bilateral approach to international customary law. 
  
B.  Hypothetical 2: Great Britain v. Japan  
  
 Some or all of these difficulties may have led Dr. Slouka to formulate a second 
hypothetical case. In this case, Great Britain v. Japan, the facts are the same as in the first case 
with the exceptions that a Japanese oil company is substituted for the American company, and 
that Japan had not by 1953 made any declaration with respect to the continental shelf issue. On 
this change of facts, no estoppel can be found that might be based on Japan's positive acts. Yet, 
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asks Dr. Slouka, could Japan be estopped by its failure to protest, because it had no easily 
exploitable shelf of its own, the continental shelf claims of others? 
  
 Although Great Britain might argue that there is an estoppel based on the Sheikh's 
assumption of exclusive jurisdiction and control in 1949, Dr. Slouka states that Japan would 
prevail in this case. He points out that four years is an insufficient lapse of time to raise an 
estoppel in light of the fact that the Sheikh's declaration was not accompanied by overt 
manifestation of control. Nevertheless, a court might be persuaded by the British position absent 
a Japanese allegation that there exists a general positive rule relating to the continental shelf in 
international law—either the res communis or the res nullius rule. But as soon as this is 
acknowledged, we find ourselves once again in the realm of general customary law and out of 
the purely bilateral relationship posited by Dr. Slouka, as he in this instance admits. FN35  
 
C. Hypothetical 3: Norway v. France  
  
 In order to test whether any such general rule exists, Dr. Slouka invents another 
hypothetical case arising in 1953: Norway v. France. In this third case a Norwegian fishing 
vessel collides with an oil-drilling platform or rig that is insufficiently equipped with warning 
devices. The rig is located on the continental shelf adjacent to France but outside of French 
territorial waters or contiguous zones. Although France had notice that the rig was being 
constructed, in line with its official attitude on the continental shelf that no general rule of 
customary international law existed with respect to the shelf, Dr. Slouka posits that France in 
1953 would not have officially acknowledged the existence of the rig. Norway, too, had taken 
such a position on the non-existence of a general rule of customary international law on 
continental shelves. Now the question is whether Norway could obtain redress against France 
under the theory that France had an obligation to enforce reasonable safety standards on rigs in 
its continental shelf waters. Dr. Slouka answers his question in the negative: "by its own  
[pg15] continental shelf policy, Norway was estopped vis-a-vis France—a country maintaining a 
similar stand-to claim French negligence." FN36  
 
 But wherein lies the estoppel here? Norway had done nothing; it had not even issued an 
official declaration on the subject. The only evidence given by Dr. Slouka as to Norway's 
attitude on the continental shelf problem was the Norwegian position at an international 
conference in 1958 (five years after the hypothetical case) that no general rule of customary law 
existed with respect to the shelf.FN37 Even if we are willing to assume, along with Dr. Slouka, 
that Norway's expressed attitude in 1958 accurately reflects its unstated attitude in 1953, it is not 
clear why such an attitude would be inconsistent with Norway's claim in the hypothetical case. 
Norway could argue that France, as the nearest coastal state, had a duty (as agent of the 
international community) to enforce reasonable safety precautions even in the high seas. In the 
alternative, Norway could claim that while the continental shelf itself did not belong to France, 
that portion of it tapped by the oil rig had a more genuine link with France than with any other 
state. Finally, as a more general point, it is not an accepted practice in international law that 
when a state expresses an opinion on the non-existence of a general customary rule that it is 
effectively barred from making specific claims that might be inconsistent with that general 
opinion. For the state might plead that it incorrectly stated the non-existence of the general rule; 
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or it might argue that the specific instance did not occur to its officials when they issued a 
general opinion, and if it had they would have appropriately modified the opinion. 
  
 Additionally, it is difficult to see how Norway's unstated attitude in 1953 could have been 
relied upon by France. Neither France nor Dr. Slouka could have known prior to 1958 what the 
Norwegian attitude was. Moreover, is it reasonable to assume that, if the hypothetical case had 
actually arisen, Norway would have expressed an attitude in 1958 contrary to its stand in the 
1953 case? This question underscores the unreality of the hypothetical case method used by Dr. 
Slouka in this instance, for he assumes that real-life conditions would not change after history 
itself has been hypothetically changed. Such an assumption is even more questionable if the 
position of France is considered. If the drilling rig actually existed off the French coast in 1953, 
France might very well have decided not to contest the Norwegian claim for damages. For the 
mere existence of the rig would point to a level of profitability of offshore oil drilling that would 
greatly exceed [pg16] the price that France might have to pay to Norway for the damage to its 
fishing vessel. Indeed, the actual installation of a rig might itself have convinced France to 
declare its exclusive jurisdiction and control over the continental shelf off its coast, and perhaps 
to see to it that warning devices were placed on the rig. 
  
D. Beyond the Hypotheticals  
  
 The difficulty with Dr. Slouka's use of hypothetical cases to demonstrate an expectation-
reliance complex is that the cases either would not have arisen in the manner in which he 
describes, or that subsequent conduct of the states in question would have or could have been 
different if the cases had actually arisen as described. The actual practice of states demonstrates 
that up through the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf not a single state—not 
even Japan FN38—had protested any of the claims to the continental shelf nor had taken any 
position in any international litigation for or against any person, company, or state engaged in 
any of the exploration and exploitation activities. Nor had any state claimed or established for 
itself exclusive rights to exploit the resources of a continental shelf adjacent to another 
state.FN39  
 
 Nevertheless, one might well ask how the uniformity of state practice just described came 
about if not by the estoppel process as illustrated in Dr. Slouka's hypothetical cases. The simple 
answer may have been furnished as early as 1950 by Lauterpacht, who argued that the regime of 
the continental shelf expressed an established rule of general customary international law. FN40 
The uniformity of state practice would thus have been a manifestation of the consensus as to the 
general rule. Lauterpacht pointed in 1950 to a certain pressure in the direction of exclusive 
coastal state jurisdiction and control over the continental shelf (and concomitant responsibility 
for the safety of navigation with respect to oil drilling platforms). This pressure might have been 
changed by contrary state actions after 1950, but in fact such actions did not take place and 
therefore the basic rule was reinforced. Even Dr. Slouka admitted the existence of a certain 
pressure by saying that "it was indeed highly reasonable to expect in 1950 that the doctrine of 
exclusive coastal shelf rights would eventually mature into a general legal system." FN41 But 
who is to say whether and when a law has "matured," and what in any case would be the 
relevance of such a determination? Even an incipient rule may have functional utility if 




 If some pressure existed by 1953 in the direction of the legality of exclusive coastal shelf 
rights, all the hypothetical cases suggested by [pg17] Dr. Slouka are easily resolved. Great 
Britain would prevail in each of the first two, not by virtue of a claimed estoppel against the 
United States or an attenuated version of such an estoppel against Japan, but simply because of 
the pressure of the general rule of customary law. That general rule would apply to all states, and 
one need not look for special bilateral relationships between states. Of course, in Dr. Slouka's 
second case, involving Japan and Great Britain, no such special bilateral relationship existed. In 
the third hypothetical, Norway would not have been estopped to institute a claim against France; 
indeed, France might have welcomed the claim if based on a general rule of customary law 
giving France exclusive jurisdiction and control over the adjacent continental shelf.  
 
 Nevertheless, the question still remains as to how the general customary rule of adjacent 
state rights to the continental shelf arose in the first place. Lauterpacht in 1950 suggested a 
variety of arguments, including, interestingly, the idea of "estoppel" linked with a "failure to 
protest." FN42 Lauterpacht's basic difficulty was to discover how a unilateral declaration by a 
state, such as the Truman Proclamation of 1945, could result in the formation of a general rule of 
customary law when the overwhelming consensus among publicists holds that a unilateral 
declaration is merely a claim having no substantive impact upon the rights and obligations of 
other states. Lauterpacht might have argued that an exception to this general consensus exists 
when the case is one of acquisitive prescription. In such a case, a unilateral declaration is a claim 
of ownership; in particular, with respect to the continental shelf, it may be the only feasible 
symbolic act FN43 that a state could make inasmuch as the territory in question is submerged 
under the high seas. Here, also, the function of protest on the part of other states would not be to 
reserve a general legal position but to rebut the particular inference of undisputed possession by 
the state making the unilateral declaratory claim. Although in this line of reasoning the role of 
protest is significant, the outcome does not yield a general rule of customary international law 
but rather establishes individual proprietary rights. Thus this reasoning was not used by 
Lauterpacht, who wanted to prove the existence of customary law in general and not, to take an 
example, American ownership of its continental shelf in particular.  
 
 Accordingly, Lauterpacht chose to argue that the general failure to protest a few 
unilateral declarations by states claiming exclusive rights in continental shelves amounted to the 
acknowledgement of a general customary rule recognizing such exclusive rights. But if the 
unilateral declarations in themselves did not affect the international rights of other states, why 
should the others have protested the declarations? What if a state unilaterally declares its 
sovereignty over [pg18] the Atlantic Ocean? Must the other states protest such a claim in order to 
defeat it? Lauterpacht does not want to go this far; he writes that if a unilateral declaration is "so 
patently at variance with general international law" as to render it "wholly incapable of becoming 
the source of legal right" then there is no need for other states to protest it.FN44 He mentions as 
an example a claim to the exclusive use of the high seas, such a claim being "so tainted with 
nullity ab initio" that protest is unnecessary.FN45 The vagueness of Lauterpacht's language is 
obvious. Who is to decide what is "so patently at variance" or "so tainted with nullity"? What 
seems patent to one observer might seem modest to another. Two directly relevant illustrations 
might be considered. First, the United States in 1954 claimed the exclusive use of a large portion 
of the high seas for nuclear weapons tests. Could Lauterpacht cite the failure of non-communist 
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states to protest the nuclear weapons tests as demonstrating the "patent" illegality of the tests? Or 
does it demonstrate their legality in light of the claim that the exclusive use of a large portion of 
the high seas was only temporary? Second, does the absence of protest of unilateral claims to the 
continental shelf demonstrate the legality of the claims, as Lauterpacht argues? Or might it 
demonstrate their patent illegality in light of the fact that vast underseas areas were involved 
which some writers had previously thought were linked with the concept of free seas and not at 
all subject to national appropriation?  FN46 Lauterpacht offers no criteria for distinguishing 
between these contrary possibilities.  
 
 Nor are Lauterpacht's general arguments on the role of protest in international law 
persuasive enough to prove that the failure of states to protest unilateral continental shelf 
declarations was formative of a general rule of international law. He argues that because courts 
of compulsory jurisdiction are often unavailable in international law, one of the only ways for a 
state to avert injury is to protest another state's intention to violate the law as expressed in that 
other state's unilateral declarations. And he finds "numerous examples" of protests in 
international law. FN47  
 
 There are, however, several basic objections to Lauterpacht's position. In the first place, a 
unilateral declaration does not itself involve a breach of international law; at worst it is an 
expression of a state's intention to commit such a breach. A state may never follow up its uni- 
lateral declaration with the threatened act; Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and El Salvador, for 
example, have never attempted forcibly to implement their declarations of exclusive fishing 
rights in territorial seas off their coasts of 200 miles in breadth (although Peru has, and stands  
 [pg19] as an exception). Since the declaring state might not follow through on its unilateral 
declaration, it is not generally considered prudent for other states to issue notes of protest 
whenever a questionable unilateral claim is made. Professor Bilder's account of the activities of 
the Office of Legal Adviser to the United States Department of State does not even mention a 
function of reacting to unilateral declarations of other states by way of notes of protest, which are 
normally actuated upon the application of aggrieved persons or corporations.FN48 In the 
preceding section, it was argued that protests will often be ineffective and hence are not made for 
that reason, or that they may be issued for "face-saving" reasons that in fact acknowledge an 
unwillingness to object more effectively.FN49 Particularly in the case of a unilateral declaration, 
a note of protest would appear to represent a failure of "quiet diplomacy" to get the issuing 
government to change its mind. Their use in this case would not appear to be a typical practice of 
states as Lauterpacht suggests.  
 
 What are the "numerous examples" of protest in international law cited by Lauterpacht? 
He only cites five cases, four of them arbitrations and two out of the four involving prescription. 
FN50 Additionally he cites an example involving an alleged breach of neutrality; and indirectly 
(by citing Oppenheim's treatise) he refers to a few incidents of protests relating to violation of 
rules of warfare.FN51 Most of these citations are irrelevant to the matter of unilateral 
declarations, an indication of the necessity to search far afield merely to list examples of notes of 
protest. Of course, many other examples could be adduced by simply paging through foreign-
office papers. But these represent only the smallest fraction of inter-governmental 
communications and an unimportant part of international relations. Indeed, they represent only a 
small fraction of all the possible protests that might have been made but never were formulated. 
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Foreign offices are not in the business of antagonizing other governments by issuing streams of 
protests, particularly when other governments issue questionable unilateral declarations or pass 
organic legislation that might someday result in a transgression of international law if 
implemented. It is thus unrealistic for Lauterpacht to claim that governments are estopped if they 
fail to protest all the unilateral declarations of other governments that fall short of "patent" 
illegality.  
 
 Thus, the idea of estoppel has not yet been persuasively demonstrated to "explain" the 
workings of international custom. Nevertheless, estoppel and failure to protest may be highly 
suggestive in directing attention to the operative features of custom. First, the fact that  
[pg20] Dr. Slouka's first case was more persuasive than the other two may be due to the 
allegations that the United States had acted administratively and legislatively to implement the 
Truman Proclamation and that a British oil company had set up a rig in the continental shelf off 
Abu Dhabi. Tangible acts were in evidence, and not merely unilateral declarations. In the other 
cases, it was harder to find "estoppel," perhaps because of the fundamental ambiguity of 
unilateral declarations (or the failure to make such declarations!)—they might or might not be 
implemented in practice, according to the discretion of the declaring state. Since the declaring 
state itself is not "bound" by its own statement (which it may withdraw or simply fail to 
implement), no other state can know for sure whether it should or should not rely on such a 
statement. However, Great Britain in the first hypothetical case may have relied more upon the 
administrative and legislative implementation of the Truman Proclamation than upon the 
proclamation itself. Thus the concept of estoppel may help us focus on physical actions of states 
as opposed to their statements of intent. Secondly, if a "precedent" is established by the actions 
of a state, the notion of "estoppel" certainly reinforces the sense of "bindingness" or 
authoritativeness of the incipient customary rule. A state which actually does something which 
may have repercussions in the realm of customary international law can be said to be "estopped" 
to allege a contrary rule later. Of course this use of the idea of estoppel is not necessary to an 
analytic appreciation of the elements of custom-formation, but it may help reinforce the 
legitimacy of the process in a psychological sense. Nor can the idea of estoppel tell us which acts 
by states may have customary international law repercussions. That does not render it 
superfluous to say that estoppel may be linked with each valid instance of custom-formation to 




 As some writers tried to make consent or estoppel the sole basis for their views of 
customary law, so too Professor McDougal has attempted to assign to the concept of 
"reasonableness" this central role. Arguing that national decision-makers operating in the 
international environment must constantly make policy choices between complementary 
prescriptions, he writes that  
 
for all types of controversies the one test that is invariably applied by decision-
makers is that simple and ubiquitous, but indispensable, standard of what, 
considering all relevant policies and all variables in context, is reasonable as 




 [pg21] It is of course important not to take this statement too literally. Presumably Professor 
McDougal would not intend it to apply to fixed treaty obligations that in the short run seem to 
one party to be unreasonable. Moreover, in other writings he does not appear to reiterate the 
claim that all decisions are reasonable. Nevertheless, he does appear to equate his concept of 
reasonableness with the traditional concept of custom in international law. By "international 
custom" Professor McDougal specifically means  
 
that total flow of explicit communications and acts of collaboration among 
peoples which create community-wide expectations that certain uniformities in 
decision will successfully survive challenge.FN53  
 
This too is an overly broad and inclusive statement, one which might well serve as a tautological 
definition of "law" as well as custom, and also of the terms "prescription" and "authority" which 
appear so often in Professor McDougal's writings. But here Professor McDougal perhaps is 
purposefully broad as he views “custom" as only one, even if it is the most basic,FN54 of a 
number of "past communications" to which national decision-makers may turn for guides to 
policy-making and indications of relevant community expectations.FN55 
  
 In the course of his writings, Professor McDougal makes a number of arguments for 
"reasonableness" as the authoritative guide to the prescriptive requirements of international 
custom. Some of these are purely descriptive of international claim-conflicts, such as the 
concepts of reciprocity, retaliation, and dedoublement fonctionnel. As such, they do not prove 
Professor McDougal's case for reasonableness. For although it is true that competing claims are 
often settled by "mutual tolerances" based on expectations of reciprocity or fear of retaliation, 
FN56 their resolution does not have to be "reasonable." A larger power may prevail over a 
smaller one that cannot communicate as credible a threat of retaliation; reciprocity may be non-
existent (e. g., the United States has a continental shelf but Japan does not); or the mutual 
toleration may maximize the interests of the immediately affected parties against larger 
community interests. In addition, the idea of dedoublement fonctionnel—where "the same nation-
state officials are alternately, in a process of reciprocal interaction, both claimants and external 
decision-makers passing upon the claims of others"FN57— does not assure that the officials will 
gradually become fairer and more reasonable by moderating their own country's claims and 
meeting [pg22] external claims halfway. Many officials simply become more hardened in a "my 
country, right or wrong" attitude. 
  
 Apart from the description of claim-conflict behavior, Professor McDougal advances a 
number of interpretive arguments on behalf of "reasonableness." First, customary rules tend to be 
"formulated at the highest level of abstraction" and hence are "ambiguous in highest degree." 
FN58 The implication is that policy-makers have a wide ambit of choice within these broad 
rules, and therefore do what is "reasonable." But the conclusion does not necessarily follow, as 
we can see from Professor McDougal's own writings. For example, the very broad or even 
ambiguous international rule of aer clausus has led, at a great economic loss, to the 
establishment of national airlines operating over international air routes. " Among all the 
stultifying ingredients of egocentric aerial nationalism," Professor McDougal observes, "this has 
probably been the most irrational."FN59 Clearly, then, he does not view aer clausus as yielding 
reasonable policy decisions in the same manner as he views mare liberum, though both are 
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clearly norms of custom. With respect to freedom of the seas, as a second example, Professor 
McDougal finds the inclusion of the "genuine link" theory in Article 5 of the Geneva Convention 
on the High Seas "drastic," "mis-conceived," "uneconomic," "positively dangerous," and 
"unnecessary."FN60 Yet the Convention was the result of a shared consensus and mutual 
toleration of many national views as perceived by lawyers and national representatives, a fact 
that might lead one to suspect that what is "reasonable" to Professor McDougal may not be so in 
the views of the international claimants whom he is purporting to describe.  
 
 This leads to Professor McDougal's second interpretive argument: that international 
claimants share a certain set of values, identified in Lasswellian terms as security, wealth, 
respect, enlightenment, well-being, affection, and rectitude. FN61 One could only hope that this 
neo-philosophy position were true. But as Professor Woetzel has observed, "policy-oriented 
approaches with other goals than human dignity, such as Marxism-Leninism" lead to different 
results and would "vitiate expectations of reciprocity in terms of general rules governing all man- 
kind." FN62 Moreover, if the Lasswellian values were universally shared, then the arguments of 
the chief interpreter of those values, Professor McDougal, would also be universally accepted. 
But even a Western observer such as Professor Falk has found unpersuasive Professor [pg23]  
McDougal's briefs in support of "the legality of the use of force by Western states in cold war 
contexts." FN63 
  
 The root of the problem may involve an age-old device of political philosophers, who 
have attempted to add to their own persuasiveness by claiming that the norms they set forth to 
govern behavior are in fact obeyed in practice by mankind in general.  Marx, Hobbes, Hegel, and 
Austin, among many others, have attempted to show "scientifically" that what ought to be the 
case is in fact the case, and nothing the reader may do will derail the historical inevitability 
perceived by the writer. So too Professor McDougal argues that the Lasswellian values not only 
should be accepted by all reasonable and decent men, but in fact they are so accepted throughout 
the world. What, then, if someone rejects them? Professor McDougal would consign such men to 
the extra-legal world, just as Rousseau, for example, solved the problem of dissent in his Social 
Contract by banishing the dissenters from the body politic.  
 
 This process obviously defines away the objectors, but in so doing defeats its own claim 
of universality. Perhaps Professor McDougal wants to do this; perhaps he wants to say, for 
example, that the Soviet Union or Red China should not be allowed to participate in the world's 
legal system. But the trouble with this approach is that, normally, it is the dissenter on any given 
legal issue whom we are trying to persuade. In his famous essay on the hydrogen bomb tests, for 
instance, there is no need to persuade the United States that the tests are legal since the United 
States claimed that they were legal. But there was need to persuade the Soviet Union and other 
states who did not agree with the claim of the United States and probably also did not share the 
Lasswellian values.  
 
 There are even greater problems in attempting to specify exactly where the values-
assuming they are shared-point with respect to concrete cases. In the first place, taken 
individually, they are vague. Does the value of "wealth" mean that a country may expropriate 
without paying compensation the assets of aliens doing business in that country so that the 
people may increase their "wealth," or does it mean that there should be no such confiscation 
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because the country in the long run will become poorer if it does so? Does the value of 
"rectitude" mean that a student should burn his draft card because he feels the war in Vietnam is 
immoral, or does it mean that the United States government alone may define the morality and 
rectitude of its foreign policy? Does a nation increase in respect if it displays its armed might 
abroad, or is there an increase in respect if it refrains from using its military power? Indeed, 
should we answer the previous question by resort to survey techniques to determine in what way 
a nation can increase its stock of respect? What if it were found, for example, that dropping 
nuclear weapons on North Vietnam would [pg24] definitely increase Asian "respect" for Old 
Glory? If such a finding could be established by statistical techniques, would Professor 
McDougal go along with it? Secondly, it is easy to imagine instances where one value would 
contradict another. "Affection" may be incompatible with "security," "wealth" with 
"enlightenment," and so forth. One's problems may indeed increase if their solution appeared to 
depend upon the definition of incompatible values. 
 
 Professor McDougal's third argument—the complementarity of customary 
prescriptions—shares some of these difficulties also. He contends that rules of custom come 
often in paired opposites, thus affording wide discretion to the policy maker. While this 
contention does not necessarily mean that the policies selected will be reasonable, nevertheless it 
renders the impact of customary prescription so feeble that the reader is inclined to grab hold of 
any straw, such as that of "reasonableness," in order to put some meaningful content into 
international law. Thus it is important to trace Professor McDougal's contention in some detail. 
  
 In the hydrogen-bomb essay, Professor McDougal describes the regime of the high seas, 
"a living, growing, customary law," as presenting a "maze of conflicting claims" categorizable 
under two sets of complementary prescriptions. FN64 The first prescription is that of "freedom 
of the seas," invoked to honor inclusive claims such as navigation, fishing, and cable-laying. The 
opposite set of claims are those of exclusive jurisdiction, summed up "in a wide variety of 
technical terms such as 'territorial sea,' 'contiguous zones,' 'jurisdiction,' 'continental shelf,' " and 
so forth.FN65 Out of the dialectics of these antithetical prescriptions, Professor McDougal offers 
a synthesis justifying the temporary exclusive use of a portion of the high seas for the American 
hydrogen bomb tests. The complementarity of the prescriptions, in short, forced American 
decision-makers to consider "security" goals of the United States and the "free world" and 
resulted in a decision that infringed temporarily but reasonably upon the set of interests charac- 
terized as "freedom of the seas." FN66 The hydrogen bomb tests, in Professor McDougal's view, 
were "reasonable, and hence lawful." FN67 
  
 One important difficulty with the apparatus of complementary prescriptions just 
described is that it proves too much. If national decision-makers are actually subject to 
complementary prescriptions, they may do whatever they desire to do in their unfettered 
discretion. Hopefully they will be "reasonable" and perhaps espouse Professor McDougal's 
values, but in fact they may often do what they feel is "reasonable" and what Professor 
McDougal would describe as irrational. Of course, if by his doctrine of complementary 
prescriptions Professor [pg25] McDougal is merely trying to say that there is no international law 
at all, then he has picked a rather cumbersome way of doing so. Moreover, the doctrine proves 
too much even in terms of his essay on the hydrogen bomb tests. For the bulk of the essay is a 
careful description of the minimal intrusions upon free fishing and navigation that accompanied 
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the United States' tests. Professor McDougal shows that the tests were well safeguarded, that 
they were temporary in duration and occupied a minimal and relatively unused portion of the 
high seas, that they were appropriately based from "strategic" trust territories with adequate 
safeguards for the native population, that the United States paid adequate compensation 
(although disclaiming legal liability) to certain interests in the area adversely affected by the 
tests, and that the tests were conducted on behalf of the nuclear security interests not only of the 
United States but also of a number of other "free world" nations.FN68 These arguments would 
well accord with the view of customary law in the present study. For if we start with a customary 
rule of "freedom of the seas" defined as a pressure upon national decision-makers, the rule was 
vindicated by the conduct of the United States in using the high seas for nuclear testing. There is 
no need to invoke "complementary" prescriptions to arrive at this result, any more than a fishing 
fleet would have to invoke "temporary exclusive jurisdiction" as a complementary prescription to 
"freedom of the seas" if fishing vessels from another state attempted to maneuver in between 
their vessels. For the rule of free seas means that one fishing party has the freedom for a 
temporary exclusive use in the immediate area of its vessels; what it does not mean is that any 
single country can "rope off" a portion of the high seas for exclusive fishing permanently. In 
short, the rule of free seas creates a pressure upon users to allow for the free use of the seas by 
others, such allowance sometimes entailing temporary exclusive jurisdictions. As Professor 
McDougal seems to concede by implication, the American tests would not have been legal had 
the United States claimed the area as a permanent testing ground. For that would have violated 
the norm of freedom of the seas, even though it might possibly have been justifiable on the 
grounds of national security interests and certainly justifiable if a set of prescriptions relating to 
exclusive use of the high seas were complementary in all respects to the set characterized as 
"freedom of the seas."FN69 
  
 A second, more basic objection to the doctrine of complementary prescriptions is its 
mistaken focus upon rationalization rather than [pg26] action. Custom in international law 
depends upon what states do, and in terms of their practice contradictory lines of conduct do not 
arise nearly as frequently as do contradictory explanations. While a proper reliance upon the acts 
(or omissions) of states sharpens the characterization of customary legal rules, a shift to a 
subjective notion of complementarity tends to make it possible for any nation to justify anything. 
Moreover, Professor McDougal unnecessarily complicates the concept of custom by taking an 
interests approach. He looks to the rationalizations of decision-makers in terms of their interests 
rather than just at the conduct itself. Yet once these rationalizations are invoked, it becomes easy 
to find among them many sets of complementary prescriptions. Lawyers the world over are 
clever enough to articulate a set of values, rationalizations, and interests (particularly those as 
simple as the well-being of the nation or as vague and all-inclusive as "security," one of 
McDougal's choice nominees) for anything that their client's states want to do. Thus, whenever 
there is a claim-conflict situation we should not be surprised to find lawyers on each side 
invoking a set of prescriptions that, taken together, are complementary. Further, we should not be 
surprised to find each side asserting that its view of the matter is the only "reasonable" one. 
  
 Professor McDougal himself plays the role of advocate in his far-ranging search to find 
prescriptions complementary to those of freedom of the seas. In his essay he cites the territorial 
sea, the contiguous zones, and the continental shelf as examples of the predominance of 
exclusive use. But none of these areas was involved in the actual hydrogen bomb testing zone, 
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which was the concrete issue in the essay. The fact that the "high seas" are bordered by territorial 
seas and in part coincide with contiguous zones does not necessarily change the character of the 
rules pertaining to the area that is conceded to be "high seas," while the rules pertaining to the 
continental shelf below seem as irrelevant as those pertaining to the air above. The "exclusive 
interests" of the coastal state in the territorial waters of course contrast with the freedom of the 
high seas, but happily they relate to two entirely different geographical areas. Such prescriptions 
are complementary only in an artificial sense, and not in the concrete sense relevant to the 
hydrogen bomb tests. If they were relevant, then it would be equally permissible to cite mare 
liberum as an excuse for violating aer clausus and vice versa. 
  
 Professor McDougal much more persuasively cites "naval maneuvers, military exercises, 
and other peacetime defensive activities" in support of the hydrogen bomb tests. FN70 For these 
have been conducted on the high seas and constitute a real precedent for larger testing programs. 
Similarly, they indicate the compatibility of temporary exclusive appropriations of portions of 
the high seas with the norm of freedom of the seas. They also indicate the importance of 
establishing  [pg27] clear warning zones in areas off the main navigational and fishing routes. 
However, Professor McDougal mentioned these precedents only in passing, without devoting 
much analysis to them; rather, he spent most of his legal analysis on territorial seas and 
contiguous zones, which are only superficially related to the "high seas." 
  
 The idea of complementary prescriptions in some cases seems to have an explanatory 
power at a high level of abstraction, but when related to specific instances is not helpful in 
deciding concrete cases. An example is Professor McDougal's analysis of the laws of warfare, 
which he finds fall between the complementary policies of military necessity and 
humanitarianism.FN71 This example is especially instructive because Professor McDougal 
synthesizes the complementary prescriptions in the generalization that warfare must be 
conducted so that there is a "minimum destruction of values."FN72 
  
 Although Professor McDougal proceeds to list his versions of what this generalization 
would entail with respect to combatants, areas of operation, weapons, objects of attack, reprisals, 
superior orders, prisoners of war, and so forth, it is never clear how instances could be resolved 
when belligerents disagree as to the weights they might assign to their values. What might seem 
to the outside observer (who is not privy to many of the critical facts) as a squandering of 
military power might appear to the belligerent as an attempt to end the war sooner by 
terrorization of the opponent. Indeed, Professor McDougal acknowledges in a footnote that 
"terror bombing...might conceivably result in less aggregate destruction of values than other 
alternatives in the application of violence."FN73 So too, a belligerent might decide that express 
violation of the rules of warfare as laid down by the Geneva Conventions or as accepted in 
general practice might terrorize the opponent; in that instance, Professor McDougal's over-riding 
value justification for military conduct might contravene any and all rules of warfare, including 
customary rules and those rules accepted by Professor McDougal.  
 
 It is significant that in his work of over 800 pages on the laws of war, Professor 
McDougal adverts only once, in a footnote, to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
He does so without relating the example to his analysis and concludes only that it is a "difficult" 
example.FN74 From the American point of view, these bombings were clearly necessary to 
21 
 
promote in the long run the "minimum [pg28] destruction of values" by bringing the war to a 
quick conclusion. Yet can an impartial observer, applying Professor McDougal's approach, reach 
the same conclusion? Was it necessary, one might ask, to demonstrate the overwhelming power 
of the atomic bombs by dropping them on population centers rather than on an offshore island? 
Was the Nagasaki bomb, as distinct from the Hiroshima bomb, necessary for any conceivable 
military or demonstration purpose? And did the bombings bring about a peace treaty that was 
significantly different from the terms offered by the Japanese in the summer of 1945? The 
relevant factor here is not what the impartial observer might conclude, but the impossibility of 
applying a standard such as the one suggested by Professor McDougal to a specific act, such as 
the atomic bombing of Japan. Subsequent observers may disagree with prior policy-makers, and 
a definitive answer to the question of "minimal" destruction cannot be rendered until after the 
event,  if at all. Thus the wartime leaders could not have access to any rational standard for 
deciding at the time whether certain policies are legal or illegal. To adopt Professor McDougal's 
"reasonableness" approach to the rules of warfare would ensure the uselessness of those rules. It 
would make a self-fulfilling prophecy of his statement that the rules of warfare merely "guide the 
attention of decision-makers to significant variable factors in typical recurring contexts of 
decision."FN75 
  
 Of course, if national decision-makers in wartime in fact treat rules of warfare as mere 
attention-getting devices, we must acknowledge that fact. But examination of state practice in 
wartime demonstrates many instances where specific rules of warfare exerted pressure upon 
decision-makers to comply with their prescriptions. This is not to say that the rules were always 
obeyed, but rather that they were sometimes obeyed and when they were disobeyed the decision 
was made with some calculation of the risks of disobedience. The degree of compliance with the 
Hague and Geneva conventions on the rules of warfare varied from general to general as well as 
from one theatre of operations to another. Yet all wars have instances of military commanders 
complying with rules of warfare despite their own judgment that to do so increased the risk to 
their own soldiers and slowed down the prosecution of the war. It is unnecessary to catalogue 
specific cases; one striking instance can be found in Professor McDougal's volume on the law of 
war. He cites memoranda prepared by the German Wehrmacht at the last stage of the war on a 
proposal that Germany denounce its international obligations concerning the conduct of the war. 
FN76 The Wehrmacht's conclusion was that there should be no denunciation, on the grounds 
that:  
 
  [pg29] (1) Strictly formally, a denunciation of the agreements is not possible. The 
 conventions concerning P. W. and wounded provide for no denunciation, the Hague 
 Convention admits a denunciation only if one year's notice is given.  
(2) On the basis of the practice of states in the wars of the last centuries, there 
exists the "International Law of Usage" which cannot be done away with 
unilaterally. It comprises the latest principles of a humane conduct of war; it is not 
laid down in writing. To respect it is however considered a prerequisite for 
membership [in] the community of states. (Prohibition on misusing the flag of 
truce, killing of defenseless women and children, etc.)FN77  
 
Although Professor McDougal cites this example to demonstrate "compelling testimony to the  
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effectiveness of the sanction of self-interest,"FN78 it is clearly fruitless to attempt to distinguish 
rules of international law on the observer's calculation of the states' self-interest. International 
law as a whole is based upon the self-interest of states; if it were not, it would neither have arisen 
nor survived. What is analytically more useful is to see in this example the pressure exerted by 
the rules of warfare. Clearly some German military leaders contemplated denouncing the rules of 
warfare, and asked the Wehrmacht's legal advisers for their opinion. The contemplated 
denunciation would not have been a mere formality; clearly it would have been intended to 
signal to certain German generals in the field that they no longer needed to respect the laws of 
warfare, a signal which presumably would not have been effective if given informally in the 
absence of an official denunciation. It is highly significant that the Wehrmacht concluded that 
“Germany will by no means free herself from this essential obligation to the laws of war" by 
such a denunciation. FN79 For this conclusion attests to the power not only of the rules of 
warfare, but of the rule of international law relating to the effectiveness of a unilateral 
denunciation of the rules of warfare. In short, something that was contemplated was not 
undertaken because of legal advice, attesting to the pressure of the traditional rules of warfare.  
 
 Admittedly, many of these traditional rules are vague and are in need of updating. But 
they do not appear nearly so vague as Professor McDougal's suggested standard of the 
"minimum destruction of values." And, however wide the possible ambit of their interpretation, 
they do not admit of the limitless area of discretion afforded by an [pg30] approach to customary 
law that would characterize all rules of custom in terms of complementary prescriptions. 
  
 Despite these objections to Professor McDougal's arguments for "reasonableness" as the 
central ordering factor in customary law, there remains an important sense in which 
reasonableness is a reinforcing factor for the authoritativeness of custom. For nearly all acts that 
states undertake appear to the actors as reasonable. If these same acts can in the future be cited as 
precedents for rules of customary law, then the authoritativeness of such citation is enhanced by 
the recognized reasonableness of the constitutive acts. Thus, reasonableness fails to provide an 
adequate basis for the obligation underlying customary law; but it does contribute 




 Like consent and estoppel, the concept of reasonableness, while failing to provide an 
adequate explanation of the source of obligation in customary international law, does play an 
important psychological role in adding to the pressure of international norms upon states. The 
result is to increase the sense of legality of the rules that are accepted by states as part of 
"customary international law."  This is not to say that each and every alleged rule of universal 
international law must contain one or more of the elements of consent, estoppel, or 
reasonableness in order for it to be "valid." "Validity" itself is only a psychological construct 
subject to widely divergent "tests" among writers and publicists. There is no single reason why 
international law, or any law for that matter, is or is not "valid"; the only operatively important 
question is whether many or most of the laws in the legal system we are talking about work most 
of the time. In the international system, as we have seen, a rule of law "works" if it exerts some 
pressure upon national decision-makers to comply with its proscriptions (or, in what amounts to 
the same thing, to recognize that opponent decision-makers are not changing the status quo 
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politically if they persuasively clothe themselves in such rules). Why rules of international law 
are effective in this manner is in part a function of consent, of estoppel, and of reasonableness, 
and in part a function of many other things (e.g., morality, habit, effective sanctions, and so 
forth). The time has surely come when writers should cease their attempts at single-factored 
explanations of the "validity" of law, and attempt to understand legal phenomena in a manner 
which to some may unfortunately be less logically rigorous or "deductive" but which at least 
holds the promise of salvaging most of the delicate and often interlocking branches of the 
subject. Logical rigor combined with single-factored analysis would chop away most of these 
branches, leaving a well-defined trunk that bears less and less resemblance to reality. In 
particular, in the  [pg31] case of international customary law, rigid adherence to any of the three 
factors discussed in this essay would leave few, if any, genuine rules of international customary 
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